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IS ECONOMIC EXCLUSION A LEGITIMATE STATE
INTEREST? FOUR RECENT CASES TEST THE BOUNDARIES
Timothy Sandefur*
INTRODUCTION
For most people, economic opportunity defines the American Dream.' For
centuries, immigrants have struggled to reach the United States for a chance to find
a betterjob or open a business to support themselves and their families. Within the
United States, Americans have fought to lower barriers, such as racism and sexism,
that stand in the way of economic opportunity. Yet many barriers remain. In par-
ticular, government regulation has often overwhelmed the right to earn an honest
living. Although these regulations are promulgated in the name of public safety and
welfare, they often bar the door of opportunity and protect, not the public, but the
private interest of established firms seeking to prevent competition from entrepre-
neurs.2 Unfortunately, while previous generations saw economic freedom as a vital
* Staff Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. J.D. 2002, Chapman University School of
Law; B.A. 1998, Hillsdale College. Mr. Sandefur is the lead attorney in the Pacific Legal
Foundation's Economic Liberty Project. In that capacity, he filed amicus curiae briefs in
Powers v. Harris, Sagana v. Tenorio, and Meadows v. Odom. He also represents the plaintiffs
in Merrifield v. Lockyer. Mr. Sandefur would like to dedicate this article to his dear friend,
Scott Cueto. "[F]riendship is precious, not only in the shade but in the sunshine of life; & thanks
to a benevolent arrangement of things, the greater part of life is sunshine." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Maria Cosway (Oct. 12, 1786), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 873 (Merrill
Peterson ed., 1984).
See, e.g., Bae v. Peters, 950 F.2d469, 471 (7th Cir. 1991); Mancuso v. Consol. Edison
Co. of N.Y., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 391, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Fifth Third Bank of W. Ohio
v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 668,674 (2003); Turner v. Turner, 809 A.2d 18,24 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2002) (depicting the American Dream as working one's way from "rags to riches"); Nat'l
Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 26 (Mo. 1966) (describing the "American dream" as
including owning one's own business).
2 There is a rich and thorough scholarship on occupational licensing abuse. See, e.g.,
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGU-
LATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 28-45 (2001); S.
DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA (1987); David
E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government Regulatory
Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 89 (1994) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Licensing Laws]; David Fellman, A Case Study in Administrative Law - The Regulation of
Barbers, 26 WASH. U. L.Q. 213 (1941); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licen-
sing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1976); J.A.C. Grant, The Gild Returns to America, 1, 4 J. POL. 303
(1942); Alex Maurizi, Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL. ECON. 399
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constitutional right,3 since the 1930s, economic regulations, including occupational
licensing laws, have greatly restricted this freedom. The regulations have been re-
viewed by courts under the rational basis test, a test so lenient that virtually no law
can fail it.4 Nevertheless, even under this deferential regime, courts have occasionally
declared that the Constitution limits the degree to which states may erect barriers
to entry into the job market.5 For example, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,6
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires occupational licensing
laws to have some "rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice" the profession.7 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated
holding that the rational basis test, while very deferential, still requires laws to have
some public justification, rather than being based on mere animus' or the desire to
benefit a particular constituency.9
In four recent cases, federal courts have been confronted with the issue of
whether regulations designed for no other purpose than to protect political insiders
from fair economic competition meet the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Most notably, in Powers v. Harris,'0 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an
occupational licensing requirement even while acknowledging that it was solely
intended to protect established companies against competition - that is, even where
the law had no public justification behind it." "[I]ntrastate economic protection-
ism," the court declared, "constitutes a legitimate state interest."'' 2 This is the most
(1974); Thomas G. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961); Jonathan
Rose, Occupational Licensing: A Framework for Analysis, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 189;
Lawrence Shepard, Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care, 21 J.L. & ECON. 187
(1978); Kathleen Stolar, Occupational Licensing: An Antitrust Analysis, 41 Mo. L. REV. 66
(1976); Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REv. 1097
(1973); Mario Pagliero, What Is the Objective of Professional Licensing? Evidence from the
US Market for Lawyers (Jan. 26, 2005) (unpublished working paper, University of Turin),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=622761.
' See generally Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207
(2003).
' See Arceneauxv. Treen, 671 F.2d 128, 136 n.3 (5thCir. 1982) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
("[Rational basis scrutiny] can hardly be termed scrutiny at all. Rather, it is a standard which
invites us to cup our hands over our eyes and then imagine if there could be anything right
with the statute.").
5 See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985).
6 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
7 Id. at 239.
s See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632-33 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
9 See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1689 (1984).
'0 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1638 (2005).
" Id. at 1221.
12 Id.
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disastrous case for economic freedom in over seventy years.' 3 Yet, despite a clear
conflict between it and the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a virtually
identical case, 4 the Supreme Court recently declined to address the issue. 5 As a
result, constitutional protection for economic opportunity remains in serious danger.
That danger is further exemplified by Sagana v. Tehorio,16 a recent Ninth Circuit
decision affirming the explicitly discriminatory labor laws of the Northern Mariana
Islands on the grounds that protecting some laborers against competition from others
is a legitimate state interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Two recent trial
court decisions -Merrifield v. Lockyer"7 and Meadows v. Odom"s - explore these
themes further by evaluating the constitutionality of occupational licensing laws that
lack any serious public-regarding justification.
In this article, I explain why mere economic protectionism is not a legitimate
state interest, and why courts must revive the common sense limits on government's
authority to grant pure political favors to economic interest groups. In doing so, I
focus on these four recent cases. Part I briefly describes the history of occupational
licensing. Part II gives a history and overview of the Powers case. In Part III, I
discuss the principles that establish why economic protectionism violates the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part IV puts
these principles into concrete form by examining cases in which labor laws discrimi-
nating against immigrants have been held unconstitutional - and the Sagana case,
which ignored such precedents. Part V concludes with the two district court decisions,
Meadows and Merrifield, which suggest some important lessons for the future of
economic liberty. Courts simply cannot avoid these lessons if the American Dream
is to remain as it has long been understood.
I. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AS A PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURE
Occupational licensing has its roots in the medieval guild system, which required
practitioners of various trades to serve as apprentices and to be approved by the
guild before going into business. 9 It was only at the end of the nineteenth century,
however, that government-enforced occupational licensing became a regular feature
of American law.2°
13 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); W. Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
"4 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
'5 See Powers v. Harris, 125 S. Ct. 1638 (2005) (denying certiorari).
16 384 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1313 (2005).
388 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
18 360 F. Supp. 2d 811 (M.D. La. 2005).
19 See YOUNG, supra note 2, at 9.
20 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-
1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL L. REv. 487,489 (1965); A. Scott McDaniel, Comment,
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Licensing was seen as a reform measure, protecting the public from dangerous
or incompetent practitioners. In Dent v. West Virginia,2' the United States Supreme
Court held that occupational licensing for doctors was a valid use of the state's
authority to protect public health and safety. That decision was written by Justice
Stephen Field, well known as the Court's leading defender of liberty of contract.22
Yet Field held that the right to earn a living may be regulated to protect public health
and safety. "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow
any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose," he wrote.23 Under the
Constitution, this right "cannot be arbitrarily taken from" any person, "[b]ut there
is no arbitrary deprivation" when the state imposes "conditions . . . for the
protection of society., 24 A state has the power "to provide for the general welfare
of its people ... [by] prescrib[ing] all such regulations as, in its judgment, will
secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity
as well as of deception and fraud. ' 25 But if a licensing scheme did not reasonably
relate to public health and safety, it would unconstitutionally "deprive one of his
right to pursue a lawful vocation. ' '26
In this decision, Field echoed his own majority opinion in Cummings v. Missouri,27
in which the Court invalidated a law barring former Confederate soldiers from various
occupations. Field held that the law was really just a disguised attempt to punish the
former soldiers, contrary to the ex post facto clause.2' Although the state claimed
the law was merely a regulation to protect the public from dishonest and dishonor-
able practitioners, 29 Field rejected this as a sham: "The Constitution deals with
substance, not shadows," he wrote.30 The ban on ex post facto laws "was levelled
at the thing, not the name.... If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the
enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding."'"
The Good, the Bad, and the Unqualified: The Public Interest and the Unregulated Practice
of General Contracting in Oklahoma, 29 TULSA L.J. 799, 802 (1994) ("Between 1911 and
1915 alone, 110 statutes licensing 24 occupations were enacted.").
21 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
22 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 109-10 (1873) (Field,
J., dissenting) (contending that the right to earn a living "is the distinguishing privilege of citi-
zens of the United States").
23 Dent, 129 U.S. at 121.
24 Id. at 121-22.
2' Id. at 122.
26 Id.
27 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
28 Id. at 318-19.
29 Id. at 294.
30 Id. at 325.
31 Id. See also Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.
Cal. 1879) ("[W]e cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance.
When we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know
as judges what we see as men.").
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In the years following Dent, licensing schemes were affirmed in several cases
involving the practice of medicine. 2 Spurred by these successes, reformers pro-
posed licensing requirements for many other professions, often with beneficial results
for public health and safety. 33 But there has always been a darker side to occu-
pational licensing. Businesses which cannot reasonably be said to endanger the public
health increasingly came under licensing requirements during the twentieth century,
so that today even arborists, 4 shorthand reporters,35 and landscape architects 36 must
be licensed. It is difficult to imagine how some of these laws can be said to protect
the public safety, even by the most strained interpretation. Although any regulation
of any business might, through some chain of reasoning, be described as serving the
public welfare, "[o]ne would.., have to be more than a little naive to overlook the
self-serving aspects of many of the goals" of such laws.37 Contrary to their image
as devices for protecting the public, licensing laws frequently do nothing more than
"benefit[] the practitioners who are in the industry at the time the restrictions are
imposed. 38
Scholars of occupational licensing have noted that licensing has generally been
"eagerly sought" by members of the professions, "always on the purported ground
that licensure protects the uninformed public against incompetence or dishonesty,
but invariably with the consequence that members of the licensed group become pro-
tected against competition from newcomers. 39 Some licensing laws are patently
absurd from the perspective of public safety. For example, Walter Gellhorn noted that
Georgia once required professional photographers to pass a syphilis test, and Indiana
required boxers and wrestlers to take a loyalty oath.' Such requirements are "pro-
bably not motivated by anything so rational as a desire to discourage competition."41
Recognizing the abuse to which licensing can be turned, the California Supreme
Court explained in 1918:
32 See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S.
505, 506 (1903); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 194 (1898).
" See Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1330 (1979); Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and
the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing
Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8
ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 208-12 (1999).
34 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3804 (2003).
" See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 8025.1 (West 1995).
36 See, e.g., id. § 5615 (West 2003),
" Ira Horowitz, The Economic Foundations of Self-Regulation in the Professions, in
REGULATING THE PROFESSIONs 3, 7 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980).
38 Moore, supra note 2, at 95.
3' Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 11.
40 Id. at 14.
41 Id.
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The exercise of the police power is available only for the purpose of
promoting the general welfare, the interests of the public as distin-
guished from those of individuals or persons. It cannot be used to pro-
mote private gain or advantage, except so far as the same may also pro-
mote the public interest and welfare, and it is the latter, and not the former,
effect which forms the basis of the power and warrants its exercise.42
Unfortunately, as with virtually all legislation, occupational licensing is subject
to rent-seeking. This means that government power to regulate professions often
falls into the hands of ambitious or politically adept groups who would try to use
that power to enrich themselves at the expense of others.43 As Gellhorn put it, "[A]
well-knit special interest group is likely to prevail over an amorphous 'public' whose
members are dispersed and, as individuals, are not in sharp conflict with the organized
interest."' In other words, legislative power to grant economic benefits or impose
economic burdens often becomes a prize in the political contest - a contest won,
not by the most deserving, but by those who have the most to benefit from favorable
legislation, and who therefore invest the most resources in the contest.4 5
The result, as we shall see, is that licensing laws, which limit economic opportu-
nity, were originally allowed insofar as they protected the public health and safety -
but have, as economists predicted, become perverted into a tool for obstructing com-
petition. As Justice Stevens warned twenty years ago:
The risk that private regulation of market entry, prices, or
output may be designed to confer monopoly profits on members
of an industry at the expense of the consuming public has been
the central concern of both the development of the common law
42 Binford v. Boyd, 174 P. 56, 58 (Cal. 1918).
43 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTrUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 286-87 (1965) ("[1]nterest-group activity...
is a direct function of the 'profits' expected from the political process by functional groups.").
4 Gellhom, supra note 2, at 16.
45 The "public choice" effect has been widely observed in occupational licensing. See,
e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation - Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REv. 1167,
1238-39 (2003) (describing this effect in attorney licensing); Horowitz, supra note 37, at
9-16 (analyzing data from several professions); Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers As Lawmakers:
A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 Mo. L. REv. 299, 314 (2004).
The politics of state licensing give reason to doubt that the social benefits
of the system outweigh the costs. Winning interest groups typically are
those who can most effectively organize to raise and spend political re-
sources. ... They will, therefore, be able to out-lobby larger but more
fragmented groups of consumers and business clients.
1028 [Vol. 14:1023
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of restraint of trade and our antitrust jurisprudence.... [Pirivate
parties have used licensing to advance their own interests in
restraining competition at the expense of the public interest.4 6
While the possibility of protectionist abuse was generally seen as a necessary
evil accepted for the greater good of consumer protection, in recent years, some
courts have come to see protectionism as itself a legitimate purpose to be served by
occupational licensing and other regulations.
II. BURYING ECONOMIC LIBERTY: THE CASKET CASES
A. Craigmiles v. Giles
Reverend Nathaniel Craigmiles was angry. Too often he saw his parishioners
exploited by funeral directors taking advantage of grieving families by charging
outrageous rates for coffins and other funeral merchandise. Unfortunately, some
parts of the funeral industry have long employed these tactics; in 1882, for instance,
the National Funeral Directors Association passed a resolution fixing prices for
adult coffins at fifteen dollars,47 a large sum in those days. That same year, Mark
Twain noted the effect of funeral cartels on the consumer. "Why, just look at it,"
a funeral director tells Twain in Life on The Mississippi.48 "A rich man won't have
anything but your very best; and you can just pile it on, too - pile it on and sock
it to him - he won't ever holler. And you take in a poor man, and if you work him
right he'll bust himself on a single lay-out. ' 49 By the time Jessica Mitford published
her expos. on the industry, The American Way of Death, in 1963, "the funeral men
ha[d] constructed their own grotesque cloud-cuckoo-land where the trappings of
Gracious Living are transformed, as in a nightmare, into the trappings of Gracious
Dying."5 An industrial machine was created in which grief and longing were met
with unscrupulous sales tactics and monopoly power, all for the financial interest
of an entrenched economic minority."
'6 Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41 See JESSICA MrrFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OFDEATH REVISrrED 158 (Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1998) (1963).
48 id.
49 MARKTWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI (1883), reprinted in MARK TWAIN, MISSISSIPPI
WRrrINGs 217, 482 (Library of America 1982).
50 MrrFORD, supra note 47, at 14-15.
5' The funeral industry has been a frequent scene of conflict between the free market and
cartel practices. In People v. Ringe, 90 N.E. 451 (N.Y. 1910), and Wyeth v. Thomas, 86 N.E.
925 (Mass. 1909), courts struck down laws quite similar to the law at issue in Craigmiles,
prohibiting anyone but licensed embalmers from officiating at funerals. In Gholson v. Engle,
138 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 1956), the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a law which prohibited
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Reverend Craigmiles's solution was to open his own business selling caskets,
urns, and other items at discount rates.52 He and Tommy Wilson, a former funeral
home employee, started the Craigmiles Wilson Casket Supply company in Chatta-
nooga, Tennessee.53 But after only four months in business, the Tennessee Funeral
Board ordered them to close their business because they did not have funeral directors'
licenses.54
Under Tennessee law, only a person with a state funeral director's license could
operate a business engaged in "funeral directing, '55 which was defined to include
"the selling of funeral merchandise, and/or the making of financial arrangements for
the rendering of the services, and/or the sale of such merchandise."56 Violations of
this law carried a penalty of thirty days in jail or a fine of fifty dollars or both.57
Neither Craigmiles nor Wilson had a funeral director's license, and obtaining one
is not an easy affair. Applicants for licenses must complete a course of study at a
board-approved mortuary school and serve for a year as an employee of a licensed
funeral director,58 or serve a two-year apprenticeship and assist in at least twenty-
any person from directing a funeral without first procuring a license as an embalmer. The
plaintiff did not embalm bodies, nor was embalming required under state law. The court
found no
public health considerations [to] justify the requirement that a funeral
director be a licensed embalmer. The funeral director is concerned pri-
marily with the amenities of the funeral service. Proper performance of
his other functions.., does not require a year of college, nine months
at an embalming school and a year's service as an apprentice embalmer.
Id. at 512. In 1948, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that a proposal to
forbid the operators of private cemeteries from selling headstones and monuments was an
unconstitutional interference with economic opportunity. Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d
883 (Mass. 1948). Although the state could certainly regulate graveyards for the protection
of public health, headstones were simply "personal property and are bought and sold like
other personal property." Id. at 886. Headstones did not endanger the public health in any
way; the law was "a regulation more of sellers of monuments than of cemeteries," id. at 887
- meaning, it was designed to prevent competition in the headstone market. Accordingly,
the court held that this was simply an abuse of the state's regulatory authority to benefit
private parties.
52 See INST. FOR JUSTICE, THE RIGHT TO URN AN HONEST LIvING: CHALLENGING TENNES-
SEE'S CASKET MONOPOLY, http://www.ij.org/economicliberty/tennessee-caskets/backgrounder.
html (last visited June 3, 2005).
53 Id.
54 id.
5 TENN. CODEANN. § 62-5-313 (2005).
56 Id. § 62-5-101(3)(A)(ii).
" See id. § 62-5-103 (defining a violation as a Class C misdemeanor); id. § 40-35-111(3)
(providing the authorized penalty for a Class C misdemeanor).
51 Id. § 62-5-305(a)(6)(A).
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five funerals.59 Then the applicant must pass an examination' to prove that he or
she "has a reasonable knowledge of sanitation and disinfection of premises, clothing,
bedding, and other articles subject to contagion and infection, and has a reasonable
knowledge of the sanitation and disinfection of bodies of diseased persons where
death was caused by infectious diseases or communicable diseases."'" Completing
a course of study at a mortuary school, however, can be exceedingly expensive. At
the time Reverend Craigmiles opened his business, there was only one board-approved
mortuary school in Tennessee: Gupton College, where the funeral director's course
costs between $10,000 and $12,000.62 The course of study included such matters
as embalming corpses63 and other skills which Craigmiles would never use.
Contending that the licensing requirement had no connection to the public wel-
fare, but served simply to protect a favored interest group against fair competition,
Craigmiles filed a lawsuit challenging the licensing law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' He did not deal with dead bodies, he argued, and he did not have any involve-
ment with a funeral beyond selling the coffin to the bereaved family.65 Requiring
him to undergo the training and expense of getting a funeral director's license de-
prived him of the liberty to earn a living in a lawful occupation, without any rational
connection to protecting the public health, safety, and welfare.66 The court agreed.67
Although the state argued that licensure protected the public from dangerous and
incompetent practitioners, the court found that the training and examination require-
ments had nothing to do with the business of selling caskets. Rather, "[t]he training
and the exam questions regarding caskets relate only to product information and mer-
chandising. These topics have no relationship to health and safety, but might be
helpful to one who sells any product. '68 Nor did caskets themselves pose any sort
of health or safety risk: "all caskets, like their contents, eventually decompose," and
rarely pose any danger to the public by doing so. 69 Moreover, even "[i]n those rare
instances where human remains (before burial) might present a public health concern,
funeral directors do not rely on caskets to negate the threat. Instead, they rely on
embalming, adjustments to the funeral arrangements, and other techniques such as the
9 Id. § 62-3-305(a)(6)(B).
o Id. § 62-5-306(a).
61 Id. § 62-5-306©.
62 Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 660 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
63 id.
64 ld. at 659.
65 id.
66 Id. at 661.
67 Id. at 662.
68 Id. at 663.
69 Id. at 662.
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use of plastic encasements for the body."7 Moreover, the state did not require the
use of caskets in human burials at all.?
Requiring a license for people selling caskets, therefore, did not protect the
public from such possible rare instances of environmental or health threats.72 The
court concluded that, even under the lenient rational basis test used in cases involving
economic liberty, the law was unconstitutional:
The key issue in this case is whether the funeral merchan-
dise sales licensure requirement is a rational means of [protect-
ing the health, safety and welfare of the public]. This Court
holds that it is not. The requirement certainly has nothing to do
with public health and safety....
... [Tihe purpose of promoting public health and safety is
not served by requiring two years of training to sell a box.73
The Court of Appeals affirmed.74 Although the rational basis test allows the
legislature to make "[e]ven foolish and misdirected" laws, the Constitution still re-
quires that laws have some bearing on the public health, safety and welfare.75 The
licensing requirement, however, had no public justification; instead, "adding the
retail sale of funeral merchandise to the definition of funeral directing was nothing
more than an attempt to prevent economic competition."76 Like the district court, the
court of appeals noted that there was no evidence that a licensing requirement for
casket sales was related in any way to protecting the public safety, and no such rela-
tionship could be imagined.77 Instead, the legislative history revealed that the law
was simply "directed at protecting licensed funeral directors from retail price compe-
tition."7 Protecting licensees from fair competition, the court held, was not part of
the government's power: "Courts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete
interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose."79
70 Id.
71 id.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 662-63.
74 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
71 Id. at 223-24.
76 Id. at 225.
r Id.
78 Id. at 227.
79 Id. at 224.
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B. Powers v. Harris
Six days after the Sixth Circuit affirmance in Craigmiles, the District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma issued a directly contrary ruling in an almost iden-
tical case, Powers v. Harris.0 That case involved an Internet casket retail company
called Memorial Concepts Online, Inc., started by entrepreneurs Kim Powers and
Dennis Bridges.8' Like Tennessee, Oklahoma law defines any person selling funeral
merchandise as a funeral director,8 2 and requires such a person to obtain a funeral
director's license.83 Obtaining a license in Oklahoma is as much a burden as in Ten-
nessee: an applicant is required to complete at least sixty hours of study in an accred-
ited college, to graduate from an approved mortuary science program, and to serve a
year as a registered apprentice."
But unlike the Craigmiles court, the district court in Powers found that this
requirement was constitutional. Under the rational basis test, ajudge must seek "any
reasonably conceivable purpose [that the challenged] laws might serve,"8 rather
than "evaluat[ing] the effectiveness of a legislative measure as well as its economic
benefits and detriments." 6 After criticizing the Craigmiles decision, Powers went
on to uphold the licensing scheme even though "this court is not persuaded that the
provisions in question advance the cause of consumer protection. Maybe they do
and maybe they don't., 87 But the concept of occupational licensing itself is a legit-
imate one, the court held, 8 and even in the absence of any evidence showing that
the law could, or did, serve the public health, safety, and welfare, it was "readily
conceivable that the licensing provisions challenged by the plaintiffs could have
been thought by the legislature to promote the goal of consumer protection."'89
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision in
Powers.90 After a long recitation of the degree of deference accorded the government
under the rational basis test,9 1 the court declared that it was
80 No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002).
81 Id. at *2.
82 OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.2(2)(d) (2000).
81 Id. § 396.3(a).
84 Id. § 396.3(b). Unlike Tennessee law, the Oklahoma law does not appear to allow any
way around the apprenticeship requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
81 Powers, 2002 WL 32026155, at *14.
86 Id. at *15.
87 Id. at *18.
88 Id. at * 17 ("Consumer protection is a legitimate goal of Oklahoma public policy and
licensure is one rational way in which the State may choose to serve that goal, despite the
impact of that choice on other public policy interests such as increased competition in the
marketplace.").
89 Id. at *18.
90 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004).
9' Id. at 1215-18.
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obliged to consider every plausible legitimate state interest that
might support [the licensing requirement] - not just the con-
sumer-protection interest forwarded by the parties. Hence, we
consider whether protecting the intrastate funeral home industry,
absent a violation of a specific constitutional provision or a valid
federal statute, constitutes a legitimate state interest.92
Taking on the Craigmiles holding directly, the court declared that "absent a
violation of a specific constitutional provision or other federal law, intrastate
economic protectionism constitutes a legitimate state interest."93 It based this deci-
sion on three primary considerations. First, it noted that Craigmiles relied on three
cases to support its finding that "protecting a discrete interest group from economic
competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose" 94 - City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey,9 5 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,9 6 and Energy Reserves Group,
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light97 - none of which were Fourteenth Amendment cases.
Accusing the Craigmiles court of "selective quotation," 98 the Tenth Circuit noted
that Du Mond and Philadelphia involved dormant commerce clause challenges to
state laws, and Energy Reserves Group involved the contracts clause.99 The dormant
commerce clause has long been held to forbid states from discriminating against
businesses from out of state, but protectionist legislation within states is a different
matter.'00 Within state boundaries, laws are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, and
since the advent of rational basis review, the Supreme Court has frequently upheld
laws designed solely to protect one industry over another within a state.1 ' Second, to
apply any more serious review of legislation would threaten the validity of the post-New
Deal regime of rational basis scrutiny."° Third, "adopting a rule against the legitimacy
of intrastate economic protectionism and applying it in a principled manner" would
require invalidating countless laws that perform no public function, but merely protect
92 Id. at 1218.
91 Id. at 1221.
9 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002).
91 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
96 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949).
97 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983).
98 Powers, 379 F.3d at 1219.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1220 ("Our country's constitutionally enshrined policy favoring a national market-
place is simply irrelevant as to whether a state may legitimately protect one intrastate industry
as against another when the challenge to the statute is purely one of equal protection.").
o' See id. at 1220-21 (citing Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003),
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 18 (1992), New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,298 (1976),
and Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)).
102 See id. at 1216-17 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154
(1938)).
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one interest group from another. °3 Economic protectionism, in fact, is a constant
occupation of legislatures: "while baseball may be the national pastime of the
citizenry, dishing out special economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains
the favored pastime of state and local governments."'" Because legislatures pass
such measures all the time, they must be constitutional. Thus, even though the
licensing law bore no connection to public safety, the legislature's decision to prevent
competition was legitimate, and the licensing law was upheld.
II. WHY PROTECTIONISM Is NOT A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST
Unfortunately, the Powers court's arguments focus too closely on the details
and ignore the overriding constitutional imperative that laws must serve some public
interest, rather than the private interests of specific, entrenched groups. 0 5 This rule
is one of the longest-standing principles of constitutional law;" indeed, it is probably
a defining trait of law itself.0 7 Even in cases applying the rational basis test, the
Supreme Court has held that some public justification for a law is still necessary.'0°
But the Tenth Circuit's rule means that laws enacted solely for the private benefit
of particular interest groups satisfies the rational basis test.
Such a holding is inconsistent with the principle of lawfulness: it would mean
that might makes right - or at least, makes constitutional. Properly understood, the
Constitution forbids government from using its coercive power to support politically
successful groups simply because they are successful. But, understanding why re-
quires us to reexamine ideas about constitutional government that have been out of
fashion for over seventy years. In particular, it requires us to seriously address issues
of political philosophy. Since the advent of modem notions of judicial deference
103 Id. at 1222.
'04 Id. at 1221.
oS See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29,
69 (1985); Sunstein, supra note 9.
" See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1690.
107 H.L.A. Hart, for example, contends that generality is one of the characteristics of law:
[T]he standard form [of a law] ... is general in two ways; it indicates
a general type of conduct and applies to a general class of persons who
are expected to see that it applies to them and to comply with it. Official
individuated face-to-face directions here have a secondary place.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OFLAw 21 (2d ed. 1994). Likewise, Friedrich Hayek argues that
special laws narrowly treating particular groups differently undermines the concept of law
because it makes law not generally applicable. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTrTUTION OF LIBERTY
209 (1960). Special, unique rules for special, unique groups detracts from the uniformity that
gives law its stability, predictability, and basic fairness. See id. This reasoning is consistent
with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Boiling v. Sharpe that due process includes equal
treatment as a rule of fundamental fairness. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
108 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
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in the 1930s,judges have been extremely reluctant to approach political philosophy.
Modern phrases like "rationally related to a legitimate government interest" and
"narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest" tend to cloak the
need for political philosophy, but in the end, that need is inescapable. Just what is
a legitimate government interest, and what differentiates it from a compelling gov-
ernment interest? The modern Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged that it
does not know what a legitimate state interest is, let alone how to distinguish it from
a compelling one." So little guidance has been provided on the point, in fact, that
Richard Epstein has called the legitimate state interest test a "bare conclusion, tan-
tamount to asserting that the action is legitimate because it is lawful.", " 0 It would
be only a mild overstatement to say that in most cases the Court is satisfied to hold
that whatever goal government chooses to pursue is ipso facto legitimate. Still, there
are some things which the Court has held are not legitimate interests. In particular,
the Court has held many times that for the majority to single out an unpopular minor-
ity to bear unfair burdens, on the basis of mere prejudice, is not a legitimate state in-
terest."' This principle is correct; what is lacking is the will to enforce it consistently.
But such a will can only come from an understanding of the principles of American
constitutionalism.'
2
A. Due Process: Which State Interests Are Legitimate and Why?
According to James Madison, writing in the social compact tradition of John
Locke, government exists to protect the rights of individuals, that is, to protect the
weak from the strong." 3 As did Locke, Madison begins by imagining what the
world would be like if there were no government - the so-called "state of nature"
- so as to discover what might lead people to create a government. In a state of
nature, stronger people would be able to rob or enslave weak people; leading to a
situation of constant physical warfare - what Thomas Hobbes described as the war
of all against all. 4 While Hobbes concluded that there was no such thing as justice
"9 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) ("Our cases have not
elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest."').110 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POwER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 109 (1985).
"' See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1995).
112 Cf. Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP.
L. REv. 173,202-03 (2003) ("If courts embrace economic protectionism as a legitimate state
purpose, they will end up achieving precisely what the framers sought to avoid.").
"3 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(characterizing "a state of nature" as a state of "anarchy... where the weaker individual is
not secured against the violence of the stronger," and that government is created to "protect
all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful" from each other).
"' See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962)
(1651) ("[D]uring the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are
in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man.").
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at all before government is created, and that the creation of the state is therefore
also the creation of right and wrong,' Locke's followers believed that justice is
antecedent to government, and even justifies it, since the purpose of government's
existence is to protect justice from being subverted by the violence that goes on in
the state of nature. Government exists only to protect people and their possessions
from the initiation of force by those who wish to deprive them of their life, liberty,
or property.1 6 This not only explains the purpose of government, it also limits what
government can do. It would be inconsistent if the government, created to protect
the weak against the strong, were to become perverted into a tool by which the strong
can continue their depredations upon the weak. To put it simply, government is cre-
ated to protect people from bullies and is thus inherently forbidden from becoming a
bully itself."7 If it does become the bully, then it is engaged in a logical contradiction,
much like a corrupt security guard at a bank who robs the bank where he works.
The problem is that in a democratic society, groups of people will compete for
the opportunity to use government's authority for their own private benefit. Modern
economists refer to this as the problem of public choice, but Madison called it the
problem of faction."' This problem is especially acute because the people not only
make the law, but also (indirectly) judge the legitimacy of those laws when they are
called into question.' If the people become corrupted and pass a law taking all
1"5 See id. at 101 ("Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no in-
justice.").
116 See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government § 94, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 373 (Peter Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (1698) ("Government has no other end but
the preservation of Property.").
"7 See, e.g., James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 515 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) ("Government is instituted to
protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as
that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that alone is ajust
government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.").
118 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 113, at 78.
"9 Id. at 79-80.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his inter-
est would certainly bias his judgment, and... corrupt his integrity. With
equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges
and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts
of legislation, but so many judicial determinations... concerning the rights
of large bodies of citizens? ... Is a law proposed concerning private debts?
It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debt-
ors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the
parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous
party, or in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to
prevail.
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property away from Jews, 120 such a law might be challenged in court. But since the
people ultimately control the court system - by voting for presidents who choose
federal judges - a powerful enough public delusion 2' might also prevent the courts
from striking down such laws, even though these laws are contradictory to the fun-
damental justification for the state's existence.
What this means is that, in Lockean political philosophy, there is a difference
between law and force. The distinction is found in the principle of generality. In
Locke's words, the legislature's power "is limited to the publick [sic] good of the
120 In the period leading up to World War II, Germany enacted a complicated variety of
statutes pursuing the policy of "Aryanization," whereby property was confiscated from
German Jews for the benefit of Aryans. See generally RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF, PACK OF
THIEVES: How HITLER AND EUROPE PLUNDERED THE JEWS AND COMMITTED THE GREATEST
THEFT IN HISTORY (1998); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 220-25 (1999). Among
such enactments were the Law Regarding the Confiscation of Assets in the Hands of Enemies
of the People and the State (July 14, 1933) and the Order Eliminating Jews from German
Economic Life (November 12, 1938). See CRT-II - Claims Resolution Tribunal, Selected
Laws, Regulations, and Ordinances Used by the Nazi Regime to Confiscate Jewish Assets
Abroad, http://www.crt-ii.org/_nazilaws/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2005); see also Order Elimin-
ating Jews from German Economic Life of 12 November 1938, available at http://www.ess.
uwe.ac.uk/genocide/econord.htm (visited Aug. 2,2005) (providing the text of the ordinance).
121 According to the framers, the "will" of the community must be the aggregate, permanent,
and reasoned will of the community and not merely the majority's tempororary unreasoned
desires. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Oct. 5, 1786), in THE COM-
PLETEMADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS, at45 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("[T]he interest of the
majority is the political standard of right and wrong [only if] ... the word 'interest' [is] synony-
mous with 'ultimate happiness' . . . as [opposed to] referring to immediate augmentation of
property and wealth."). As Alexander Hamilton famously put it,
It is a just observation that the people commonly intend the PUBLIC
GOOD.... But [the people's] good sense would despise the adulator
who should pretend that they always reason Right about the means of
promoting it.... [T]hey sometimes e.. . beset as they continually are
by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious,
the avaricious, the desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their
confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess
rather than to deserve it. When occasions present themselves in which
the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is
the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians
of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion in order to give
them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection. Instances
might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from
very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured lasting
monuments of their gratitude to the men who had courage and magna-
nimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.
THE FEDERALIST No. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 113, at 432.
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Society."' 12 A law differs from a mere act of force in that the former has a public
justification. For example, the police officer arrests a person to protect the public
from a wrongdoer. This would be "law." But an enactment which confiscates the
property of Jewish citizens, simply because they are a disliked minority, would be
an act of force, not justified by principles of public protection that legitimize the
state in the first place. When government force is employed for private benefit
rather than for a public reason, the people are not secure from arbitrary, unpredict-
able acts of coercion, which means that the government is failing to serve its purpose.
In modem times, the principle of generality was described as an essential com-
ponent of law by Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek. 123 For a rule to qualify as "law,"
Hayek contended, it must be an abstract regulation describing conduct under given
circumstances - not a particular order compelling any particular person to do any
particular thing. 124 Laws are "purpose-independent rules which govern the conduct
of individuals towards each other, are intended to apply to an unknown number of
further instances, and by defining a protected domain of each, enable an order of
actions to form itself wherein the individuals can make feasible plans.' ' 125 Thus
generality is what distinguishes law from the mere "will of the ruler. ' 126 Law, in
short, is the opposite of arbitrariness. 27
It bears emphasizing that legislation does not qualify as law simply because it
is approved by a legislative majority. James Wilson told the Pennsylvania Ratifica-
tion Convention "that the power of the constitution [is] paramount to the power of
the legislature, acting under that constitution. For it is possible that the legislature,
when acting in that capacity, may transgress the bounds assigned to it, and an act
may pass, in the usual mode, notwithstanding that transgression."'' 28 Legislation is
merely a statutory creation of a particular majority at a particular time; it is simply
122 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 135, in Two TREATISES oFGoVERN-
MENT, supra note 116, at 403.
123 See, e.g., 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 6 (1973); 3 id. (1979) at
101-02.
124 Id. at 86-87.
'25 Id. at 85-86.
126 Id. at 82.
127 There is, unfortunately, good reason to believe that a generality requirement alone is
not enough to ensure that the state does not fall prey to conflicts between interest groups. See
ANTHONY DE JASAY, JUSTICE AND ITS SURROUNDINGS 170-85 (2002). Jasay contends that
generality alone "cannot be sufficiently defined to allow us to tell rules that are general from
rules that are not." Id. at 178. Without something more, a nation's constitution will gradually
be driven by public choice pressures because "majorities choose legislation that maximizes
their gains from politics, and they learn to choose a constitution that maximizes the scope for
such legislation." Id. at 83.
128 James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), in 1
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTrrUTION 823 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
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an assertion of political power,12 9 which means a use of coercion by the state. But
legislation might be corrupt - it might be an attempt by bullies to violate the rights
of an unpopular minority - and, therefore, not law. This is the rationale behind
what has come to be called "substantive due process." 30 Mere enactment, therefore,
cannot be due process' because law is a qualitative concept, not merely a formal
label. An enactment which lacks the characteristics of law, but still deprives a per-
son of life or liberty or property for no public reason, is a mere act of force, regard-
less of the procedures used to enact it. The Due Process Clause was intended (among
other things) to prevent special laws whereby unpopular minorities were subjected
to unfair burdens simply due to their unpopularity - that is, it was written to
require that deprivations of life, liberty, and property were engaged in for legitimate
public reasons, rather than as a mechanism of bullying behavior.
None of these ideas were new in the so-called Lochner era. In an article called
The Security of Private Property, published anonymously in the American Law Maga-
zine in 1843, we find the following:
It is certainly a principle, that the general powers of sover-
eignty are vested in the state governments... [which] are govern-
ments of general powers.... Yet what are the general powers of
government in a civilized society? Is there no lex legum, inde-
pendent of express constitutional restrictions?... [S]uppose the
129 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 113, at 467 (distin-
guishing between enactments of legislators and the permanent, overriding will of the people
enunciated in the Constitution).
130 The best early example of this view is Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 DalI,) 386 (1798). Chase explains that constitutions have a purpose and that legislation
which blatantly contradicts this purpose is therefore unconstitutional even if such legislation
is not prohibited by a constitution's express language. Id. at 383. "The nature, and ends of
legislative power will limit the exercise of it." Id. Therefore legislation which attempts to
"authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal
liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established," and
therefore is only "[a]n ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law)." Id.
'3' As Sunstein puts it,
The [constitutional] prohibition of naked preferences, enforced as it is
by the courts, stands as a repudiation of theories positing that the judicial
role is only to police the processes of representation to ensure that all
affected interest-groups may participate. It presupposes that courts will
serve as critics of the pluralist vision, not as adherents striving only to
"clear the channels" in preparation for the ensuing political struggle. In
this respect, the prohibition of naked preferences reflects a distinctly
substantive value and cannot easily be captured in procedural terms.
Moreover, it reflects an attractive conception of politics, one that does
not understand the political process as simply another sort of market.
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1692-93 (citations omitted).
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legislature to pass a law arbitrarily depriving a citizen of life or
liberty, without fault or crime on his part, must we look in the
constitution for an express disaffirmance of such a power?' 32
An act by the majority which is motivated simply out of ire or simply from a
desire to, in Madison's words, "despoil and enslave the minority of individuals,"' 33
is an arbitrary act of force and not law. It therefore follows that to take property or
liberty pursuant to such an act would be to deprive a person of property or liberty
without due process of law.
Probably the clearest explanation of substantive due process occurs in the case
of Loan Ass'n v. Topeka.'34 There, the Supreme tourt held that the government
violated the due process clause by spending tax dollars (taken from individuals
without their consent) to invest in a private, for-profit railroad run by a small
minority of individuals.'35 The reason for this holding was that the railroad owners
were using the apparatus of the state to take other people's property for their own
private profit - essentially the same as if they had walked down the street with
guns, stolen money from people on the sidewalk, and invested it in their railroad.
"There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all
free governments,"' 36 the Court explained,
which are respected by all governments entitled to the name.
No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute
which enacted that A. and B. who were husband and wife to
each other should be so no longer, but that A. should thereafter
be the husband of C., and B. the wife of D. Or which should
enact that the homestead now owned by A. should no longer be
his, but should henceforth be the property of B.
Of all the powers conferred upon government that of tax-
ation is most liable to abuse.
... To lay with one hand the power of the government on
the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon
favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up pri-
vate fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under
the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation.
It is a decree under legislative forms.'3 7
132 The Security of Private Property, 1 AM. L. MAG. 318, 334 (1843).
133 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 121, at 45.
134 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
131 Id. at 661-62.
136 Id. at 663.
1' Id. at 663-64 (citation omitted).
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Substantive due process, in short, is a rule requiring the legislature to engage in law,
rather than mere enactment. 38 When the legislature is captured by a group which
seeks to steal property from a minority, or otherwise infringe on a minority's liberty,
simply on the basis of their political power, it is no longer making law and, therefore,
violates the Due Process Clause.
This older "class legislation" rationale for substantive due process has been
supplanted in recent decades by a "fundamental rights" rationale, which provides
that the primary focus in substantive due process analysis is on the nature of the
right at issue in a particular case. As the Court put it in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey:39 "[T]he Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component
as well, one 'barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the pro-
cedures used to implement them.""' This explanation is cruder than, but still related
to, the now-ignored theory of Loan Ass'n v. Topeka. 4' Just as mere exertions of
force without public justification are off limits to the government entirely, there are
some aspects of personal behavior which are simply none of the government's
business, and even if legislation affecting these aspects is passed in a manner that
satisfies all the procedural requirements of the law, those enactments are simply be-
yond the bounds of any legitimate government.'42 Some rights are so valuable that
interferences with them can never be imagined to serve a legitimate goal of govern-
ment; hence legislation interfering with those rights are much more likely to be mere
acts of force, rather than law.
Economic protectionism is a perversion of legal authority because it is a mere
use of force for the benefit of a particular, private interest group. It limits the free-
dom of some members of society solely for the benefit of others, with no public just-
ification.'43 Even after the end of the Lochner era, courts have struck down abusive
licensing requirements in cases where the licensed profession could present no ser-
ious threat to the public safety, or where the licensing requirement was truly absurd.'"
138 In Hayek's words, substantive due process is a "basic clause... defin[ing] ... law in
this narrow sense of nomos which would enable a court to decide whether any particular resol-
ution... possesse[s] the formal properties to make it law." 3 HAYEK, supra note 123, at 109.
19 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
'4 Id. at 846 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
'4' It is cruder because it imposes a set of what Jasay calls "reference variables," which
are supposed to indicate to a reviewing court when a law fails the generality requirement. See
JASAY, supra note 127, at 184. But these reference variables are "not a firm but a shifting"
foundation, "contingent on cultural change." Id. Over time, courts may come to declare that
enactments once considered not general enough actually are general because they serve some
normative predicate which has now come into general use.
142 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
'43 Seefurther 3 HAYEK, supra note 123, at 1-19 (explaining why special interest legislation
is not "law").
'" See, e.g., Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So. 2d 579, 583-84 (Fla. 1966) (invalidating a
residency requirement for accountant licenses under rational basis test); Ohio Motor Vehicle
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For instance, in 1945, the Supreme Court of Florida struck down an occupational
licensing requirement for professional photographers.'45 Noting that occupational
licensing laws, when taken to an extreme, "possess the essentials or elements of a
monopoly," the court found that professional photography did not reasonably threaten
the public safety." In 1952, the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidated the state's
Watchmaking Act, which required any person practicing the trade of watchmaking
to first serve afour-year apprenticeship for a licensee.' 47 Watchmaking simply did
not endanger the public, the court held. It was far more reasonable to see the law
as "placing in the hands of those holding a license the power to limit the number of
those allowed to engage in watchmaking in Oklahoma, and clearly tend[ing] toward
creating a monopoly," and, therefore, an abuse of the state's regulatory power.
148
Courts have never held that a regulation that simply benefits political insiders,
for no reason other than that they are insiders, is permitted under the Due Process
Clause.'49 In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 150 the Supreme
Court held that a man who had been a member of the Communist Party could not
be denied the opportunity to take the bar exam for that reason. The Court held that
his political views bore no connection to the legitimate requirement that a person
must demonstrate his qualification to practice. " ' Any legal qualification for engaging
in a trade
must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or
capacity to practice .... Obviously an applicant could not be
excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a
member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible
standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when
there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these stan-
dards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.5 2
Dealer's & Salesmen's Licensing Bd. v. Memphis Auto Sales, 142 N.E.2d 268, 274-75 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1957) (striking down a licensing requirement for retail auto sales under rational basis
test).
141 Sullivan v. DeCerb, 23 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1945); accord Bramley v. State, 2 S.E.2d 647
(Ga. 1939); State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. 1949).
"4 DeCerb, 23 So. 2d at 572.
"47 State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 248 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1952).
141 Id. at 614.
149 In his remarkable article The Gild Returns to America, J.A.C. Grant candidly acknow-
ledged that occupational licensing had led to a revival of the Medieval guild system - one
which "makes use of government for its own purposes, which is a very different thing from
subjecting itself to government," - and applauded the result. 4 J. POL. 303, 316 (1942).
150 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
... Id. at 238-39.
'52 Id. at 239 (citations omitted).
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Occupational licensing could not be used for the sole purpose of excluding
those who are unpopular; rather, such laws must promote the legitimate state interests
of protecting the public safety by ensuring that practitioners are qualified.' 3 Both as
originally understood and under its modem rational basis interpretation, therefore,
the Due Process Clause forbids government from enforcing barriers on disfavored
groups simply because they are disfavored.
B. Equal Protection: Animosity Is Not a Legitimate State Interest
The "class legislation" understanding of substantive due process survives not
only in some aspects of modem due process law, but in equal protection law as well.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, government may divide people into groups and
treat those groups differently if, among other things, its goal is sufficiently compel-
ling. Any analysis of whether a legislative goal is compelling will involve a primary
question of political philosophy: What is a legitimate, or compelling, government in-
terest?
In several cases, the Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause
does not allow government to enact laws based on mere animus toward a disfavored
group. Such cases date back at least to Yick Wo v. Hopkins,54 which struck down
a San Francisco ordinance aimed at shutting San Francisco's Chinese-owned laundries
on the grounds that "the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a New York law prohibiting
milk companies from charging less than a minimum amount, is probably the most extreme
instance of deference to economic regulation challenged under the Due Process Clause). The
Court held that this was constitutional because it was designed - however absurdly - to
ensure a plentiful supply of milk in the city, a public-regarding rationale. See id. at 530. And
the Court acknowledged that economic regulations would violate the Clause if they were
"arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 536 (emphasis added). See also id. at 537 (defining due
process limitation as " reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose ... neither ar-
bitrary nor discriminatory" (emphasis added)). The Court has never held that naked eco-
nomic preference per se is a legitimate state interest. One exception to this would be the
"market participant" doctrine in dormant commerce clause cases. See, e.g., White v. Mass.
Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,208 (1983). But in these cases, government
is acting essentially as a private buyer in the marketplace would. The market participant
doctrine simply treats states as buyers free to purchase what they wish. That choice does not
curtail the economic opportunities of outsiders in the same way that state regulation does
because in the latter case, the state is employing its coercive power. See Smith Setzer & Sons,
Inc. v. S.C. Procurement Review Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1318 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[S]tate
participation in the market, even participation that is frankly discriminatory in excluding
foreign interests from receiving its benefits, does not establish barriers within the general
market framework that impede interstate commerce, such activity falls outside the scope of
the negative Commerce Clause.").
' 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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of equal laws."'" In more recent cases, the Court has reiterated that legislative
animus towards politically disfavored minorities is not a goal the government may
pursue by creating categories of citizens. In Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno,'"
the Court struck down a regulation aimed at preventing "hippie communes" from
obtaining food stamps, because the regulation had no public justification but simply
enforced hostility to a disfavored minority. A mere "desire to harm a politically un-
popular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,"" 7 the Court held.
Also, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,' the Court held that the
city could not deny a zoning permit simply on the basis of animus toward the mentally
retarded:
[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not
permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded
differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the
like.... [T]he City may not avoid the strictures of [the Equal
Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of
some fraction of the body politic. "Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or in-
directly, give them effect."' 15
9
In Romer v. Evans, 60 the Court again repeated that "animosity toward the class
of persons affected" is not a legitimate state interest and does notjustify the govern-
ment treating some people differently than others.' 6' This line of cases has set a
bottom limit to the goals government may pursue. At the very least, it may not pass
laws motivated by "animosity," a term which refers to an irrational hostility toward
a person on the basis of irrelevant differences, or "'we-they' antagonism"' 6 2- what
I have called "bullying" in this article. When government treats classes of persons
differently, that choice must be based on some larger public benefit rationale.' 63
The same applies to cases involving economic discrimination. Yick Wo, for
example, dealt with the right of Chinese immigrants to work in laundries, a prime
155 Id. at 369.
156 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
'.. Id. at 534 (emphasis in original).
,58 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
'59 Id. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
160 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
161 Id. at 634.
162 Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term - Foreword: Leaving Things Un-
decided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 4, 62-63 (1996).
163 Unfortunately, as Sunstein notes, "we have seen enough to be able to say that hatred
and fear can always be translated into public-regarding justifications." Id. at 62.
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example of the exploitation of economic regulatory authority to exclude unpopular
minorities."6 There are many other sad examples of occupational licensing laws
being used to exclude oppressed racial minorities from economic opportunity.
165
As Robert McCloskey pointed out, the rationale behind judicial solicitude for poli-
tically weak minorities 166 applies equally to economically excluded groups:
Prejudice against Jehovah's Witnesses for their "queerness"
makes repressive governmental action more probable, and pre-
cisely because of their queerness they are not likely to be nu-
merous enough or influential enough in any given community so
that their weight will be felt in the city council. To speak of their
power to defend themselves through political action is to
sacrifice their civil rights in the name of an amiable fiction....
Perhaps it is true that a prosperous corporation can effectively
plead its case at the bar of legislative judgment by resort to
publicity and direct lobbying.... But the scattered individuals
who are denied access to an occupation by State-enforced barriers
are about as impotent a minority as can be imagined. The would-
be barmaids of Michigan or the would-be plumbers of Illinois
have no more chance against the entrenched influence of the
established bartenders and master plumbers than the Jehovah's
Witnesses had against the prejudices of the Minersville School
District. 167
The Supreme Court appears to have recognized this fact in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Ward,168 when it invalidated an Alabama law that imposed heavier
'64 See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases,
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999).
165 See Bernstein, Licensing Laws, supra note 2.
'66 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982).
[G]ovemmental action [which] seriously "curtail[s] the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minor-
ities"... implicates the judiciary's special role in safeguarding the inter-
ests of those groups that are "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the major-
itarian political process."
Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938), and San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)) (third alteration in original).
167 Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 34, 50. McCloskey is referring to Minersville Sch. Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which was overruled in W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
168 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
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taxes on out-of-state insurance companies than on in-state insurance companies.
The tax was immune from dormant commerce clause challenge, 69 but the Court
found that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause. "In the equal protection
context," wrote Justice Powell for the Court, "if the State's purpose is found to be
legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be
rationally related to that purpose." 70 The purpose that the state provided as justifying
the discriminatory tax was to protect domestic insurance companies against compe-
tition from out-of-state companies. The Court rejected this because
then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the State could
show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business.
A discriminatory tax would stand or fall depending primarily on
how a State framed its purpose - as benefiting one group or as
harming another. This is a distinction without a difference ....
[P]romotion of domestic business by discriminating against
nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state purpose.'
It is especially important that the Court saw through the state's argument that
it was not trying to harm outsiders, only to benefit insiders.' The Court spurned
this "distinction without a difference," and in doing so, cited Bacchus Imports Ltd.
v. Dias,'73 a dormant commerce clause case which rejected a similar argument
advanced in defense of a state protectionist law. "Virtually every discriminatory
statute," the Court noted in Bacchus Imports,
can be viewed as conferring a benefit on one party and a detriment
on the other, in either an absolute or relative sense. The determi-
nation of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one fo-
cuses upon the benefited or the burdened party.... [I]t could
169 See id. at 880 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15).
170 Id. at 881.
171 Id. at 882 (citation omitted).
172 See also Delaware River Basin Comm'n v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth., 641
F.2d 1087, 1099-1100 (3d Cir. 1981).
It is always possible to hypothesize that the purpose underlying a
classification is the goal of treating one class differently from another.
A statute's classifications will invariably be rationally related to a pur-
pose so defined, since the "purpose" is, in effect, a restatement of the clas-
sification.... [This] would... render the rational basis standard no stan-
dard at all.
Id. (citation omitted).
173 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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always be said that there was no intent to impose a burden on one
party, but rather the intent was to confer a benefit on the other.'74
Ward stands for the proposition that something more than a simple naked preference
- some public-regarding justification - must support any government act granting
economic benefits to some groups over others. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has put it: "[I]t is untenable to suggest that a state's decision to favor one group of
recipients over another by itself qualifies as a legitimate state interest."'75
Finally, as McCloskey suggested, it is often helpful to compare the judicial treat-
ment of economic liberty to other kinds of liberty. It would hardly be maintained that
a legislature's desire to promote, say, a particular religion, would be a legitimate
state interest entitling it to forbid the free exercise of competing religions, or that
the legislature's desire to advertise a particular message - which the legislature cer-
tainly may do 176 - would permit it to censor opposing messages. 177 Yet this is the
principle adopted by the Powers court. The legislature's decision to grant protection
to a politically favored group is legitimate, regardless of whether doing so has some
public-regarding justification; the legislature's act legitimizes itself. By that principle,
unfortunately, there is no possible limit to the range of "legitimate" government
interests, and the notion of distinguishing them from illegitimate interests is a sham.
III. ECONOMIC EXCLUSION IN PRACTICE: THE SAGA OF SAGANA
Economic protectionism is nothing new to the Supreme Court. In several cases,
the Court has held that merely protecting natives against competition from immigrants
is not a legitimate state interest. Unfortunately, in the recent case of Sagana v.
Tenorio,'78 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disregarded these decisions and agreed
with the Tenth Circuit's Powers rationale, that mere economic protection is a legit-
imate state interest. Although the case did not involve occupational licensing itself,
Sagana gives us a better sense of why mere economic animus should not be considered
a legitimate state interest for due process and equal protection purposes, in licensing
as well as other areas of the law.
'74 Id. at 273.
17" Ranschburg v. Toan, 709 F.2d 1207, 1211 (8th Cir. 1983).
176 See Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech,
86 IOWA L. REv. 1377 (2001).
177 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
178 384 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1313 (2005).
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A. Protecting the Wages of Natives Is Not a Legitimate State Interest
The tendency of legislatures to restrict employment opportunities to favored
constituencies is a constant threat to the rights of aliens who are entitled to the equal
protection of the law. '79 Hostility toward immigrants and immigration routinely has
been predicated on competition forjobs. Among the most extreme examples is the
California Constitutional Convention of 1878, called in large part to protect white
European immigrants from competition from Chinese immigrants. 8 ° Delegates at
the Convention came close to prohibiting the Chinese from owning property or
working for any corporation. In striking down a similar law shortly thereafter, one
federal judge expressed shock
that such legislation as this could be directed against a race
whose right freely to emigrate to this country, and reside here
with all 'the privileges, immunities, and exemptions of the most
favored nation,' has been recognized and guaranteed by a solemn
treaty of the United States, which not only engages the honor of
the national government, but is by the very terms of the constitu-
tion the supreme law of the land.'8
Nevertheless, state discrimination against immigrant workers continued through-
out the twentieth century. In Truax v. Raich,l8 2 the Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause was violated by an Arizona law designed to protect the jobs
of natives against Mexican immigrants. The law was "frankly... title[d] ... '[a]n
act to protect the citizens of the United States in their employment against non-
citizens,"" 8.. 3 and it required that for any business employing more than five workers,
at least eighty percent of the employees must be American citizens.'84 The law was
an admittedly protectionist measure, the Court held, and the result was that "the
'7 See THOMAS SOwEL, THEECONOMICS AND POLITICS OFRACE 204 (1983) ("[S]uppliers
of labor... seek to restrict the numbers and categories of labor admitted."); Irene Scharf,
Tired of Your Masses: A History of and Judicial Responses to Early 20th Century Anti-
Immigrant Legislation, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 131, 137 (1999) ("Not only did business leaders
attack the newcomers, but so also did organized labor, jealous of competition for jobs from
the immigrants."); see also IRIS CHANG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY
38-156 (2003). Chang details California's nineteenth century legal discrimination which
"ma[de] it difficult for the Chinese [immigrants] to find any work at all." Id. at 128.
"s See Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday's
Rationality Review Isn't Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457,469-72 (2004).
181 In re Parrott, 1 F. 481,495-96 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
182 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
183 Id. at 40.
184 Id.
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complainant is to be forced out of his employment as a cook in a restaurant, simply
because he is an alien."' 5 But the right to earn a living "is of the very essence of
the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment to secure," ' 6 and if this right "could be refused solely upon the ground
of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal pro-
tection of the laws would be a barren form of words.' 8
7
The state contended that the law was a public safety measure in that protecting
the wages of native workers was a public service. 8 But the Court rejected this argu-
ment:
It is no answer to say.., that the act proceeds upon the assump-
tion that "the employment of aliens unless restrained was a peril
to the public welfare." The discrimination against aliens in the
wide range of employments to which the act relates is made an
end in itself and thus the authority to deny to aliens, upon the
mere fact of their alienage, the right to obtain support in the
ordinary fields of labor is necessarily involved....
... The restriction now sought to be sustained is such as to
suggest no limit to the State's power of excluding aliens from
employment .... The discrimination is against aliens as such
in competition with citizens in the described range of enterprises
and in our opinion it clearly falls under the condemnation of the
fundamental law.1 89
Similarly, in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,190 the Court found a
California law prohibiting Japanese citizens from obtaining licenses to fish off the
state's coast to be unconstitutional.' 9 ' The Court held that, although the federal
government may regulate immigration, such a power does not permit a state to
"adopt... the same classifications to prevent lawfully admitted aliens within its
borders from earning a living in the same way that other state inhabitants earn their
living."' 92 Again, the law was designed to protect natives against competition from
outsiders - an interest which the Court did not consider legitimate. And in Sugarman
... Id. at 41.
1986 Id.
187 id.
IN Id.
'19 Id. at 41-42, 43.
190 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
' ' See id. at 413, 422.
'92 Id. at 418-19.
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v. Dougall,93 the Court held that a New York law limiting civil service positions
to citizens of the United States violated the Equal Protection Clause.'94 Aliens,
wrote Justice Blackmun for the Court, are "entitled to the shelter of the Equal
Protection Clause. This protection extends, specifically, in the words of Mr. Justice
Hughes, to aliens who 'work for a living in the common occupations of the commu-
nity."" '  The state argued that the citizenship restriction served a legitimate state
interest in preserving the state's political identity,196 but the Court noted that the
"breadth and imprecision" of the restriction revealed that it did not serve this
interest. '97 Rather, the law was a device for protecting residents from competing for
civil service jobs - an interest the Court did not find legitimate. 98 Reflecting on
this line of cases, the Supreme Court has noted that when it comes to economic dis-
crimination against immigrants, "States have had the greatest difficulty in persuading
this Court that their interests are substantial and constitutionally permissible."' 99
This is as it should be. One of the primary purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to secure the right of formerly disenfranchised persons - particularly for-
mer slaves - to "work in an honest calling and contribute by your toil in some sort
to the support of yourself, to the support of your fellowmen, and to be secure in the
enjoyment of the fruits of your toil."2" It would be very strange for an amendment,
intended to protect the new members of American society in their economic freedom,
not to apply to immigrants as well.
B. Sagana v. Tenorio - Protecting Residents Justifies Alienage Discrimination?
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) is subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment the same as a state.2"' Yet, it enforces a law called the Non-
resident Worker's Act (NWA),2°2 which places heavy restrictions on the employ-
ment of lawfully admitted nonresident alien workers. Among other things, the law
requires employers who wish to hire nonresidents to notify the CNMI Department
'9' 413 U.S. 634 (1973); accord Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976)
(holding that barring lawfully admitted resident aliens from employment violated Due Process
Clause).
"9 Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 646.
'9' Id. at 641 (quoting Truax v. Reich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)).
196 Id. at 642-43.
197 Id. at 643.
198 See id. at 644-45.
'9' Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
603 (1976).
200 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 86 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham). See
also Sandefur, supra note 3, at 229.
201 See Basiente v. Glickman, 242 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001).
202 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4411 (1983).
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of Labor, which seeks resident workers to place in the position instead. °3 At least
ten percent of an employer's work force must be made up of residents. 2°4 The Depart-
ment of Labor preapproves all employment contracts for nonresident workers, and
employers are required to post a bond covering three months of wages, medical cov-
erage, and repatriation expenses.0 5 Employers must pay nonresidents biweekly, in
cash, and must pay special minimum wages.2' The NWA forbids the hiring of non-
resident workers for certain jobs entirely.0 7
Bonifacio Sagana was a nonresident worker who entered the CNMI in 1991 and
worked as a security guard until 1994.208 After running into trouble with immigra-
tion authorities in the CNMI, Sagana filed a civil rights lawsuit seeking a legal dec-
laration as to whether he "ha[d] the right to freely market his labor in the common
occupations of life to any prospective employer without restriction and on equal
terms as any citizen for so long a period as [he was] lawfully admitted to the CNMI
as a nonresident worker., 20 9 The question before the court was therefore very precise,
and the court assumed for purposes of the case that Sagana had been legally admitted.10
The Ninth Circuit found that the NWA's restrictions on employment were not
designed to protect the public against dangerous or wrongful business practices, but
were instead designed to protect residents against competition from lawfully admitted
nonresidents. 21' Nevertheless, the court held, such preferences served a legitimate
state interest:
The CNMI legislature has seen fit to create a temporary class of
employees for the purpose of bolstering the CNMI economy,
giving job preference to its residents, and protecting the wages
and conditions of resident workers while enforcing a system to
control and regulate its visiting laborers. These are reasonable,
important purposes.212
203 Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1313 (2005),
at 734-35 (citing §§ 4431, 4432).
204 Id. at 735 (citing § 4436(a)).
205 Id. (citing §§ 4434(a)(1), 4435).
206 Id. (citing §§ 4436(c), 4437(b)).
207 Id. (citing §§ 4434(e)(1)-(2), (h), (I)).
208 id.
209 Id. at 735-36.
210 See id. at 736-40.
211 Id. at 741.
212 Id.
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To support this conclusion, the court cited three cases, Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,21 3
INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc.,214 and the unreported case of
Kin v. Government of Northern Mariana Islands.2"'
Although in Sure-Tan and National Centerfor immigrants'Rights the Supreme
Court concluded that "[a] primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve
jobs for American workers, ' 216 the Court was engaged only in a statutory interpreta-
tion of federal immigration laws, and did not discuss the constitutionality of this pur-
pose at all. More importantly, the equal protection guarantee only applies to "person[s]
within [the relevant] jurisdiction." '217 Immigration policies which limit the number
of immigrants admitted for protectionist purposes are distinguishable from the treat-
ment of immigrants once they have been lawfully admitted - which the Sagana
court was bound to assume was the case.2 " Neither of these cases supports the con-
clusion that economically discriminatory federal immigration policies are constitu-
tional, let alone that lawfully admitted non-resident aliens may be legally discrimi-
nated against to protect residents from economic competition. The latter contention
is especially contrary to the weight of case law on the subject.
Kin provided even weaker support for the conclusion in Sagana. Written by the
same judge who decided Sagana at the district court level, Kin was a district court
decision which upheld the Mariana Islands' regulation of nonresident workers. The
conclusory basis for the decision was that "[tihere is no bright line test to determine
what is an important governmental interest.... The Court finds that controlling and
regulating nonresident workers is an important governmental interest.,
219
Sagana's holding - that giving job preferences to residents, and "protecting the
wages and conditions of resident workers... are reasonable, important purposes '220 -
conflicts directly with Truax, Takahashi, and other cases 22' holding that economic
opportunity must be extended alike to all legally admitted aliens. While a sovereignty
might be authorized to refuse admittance on the basis of economic protection, there
is no constitutional basis for treating people differently after they have been legally
admitted. And, following Ward222 and Bacchus Imports, 223 it cannot be argued that
213 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
214 502 U.S. 183 (1991).
215 Civ. A. No. 88-0022, 1989 WL 311391 (D. N. Mar. I. Jan. 27, 1989).
216 Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. at 194 (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893).
217 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
218 Because the Equal Protection Clause does not explicitly apply to the federal government,
the Supreme Court has held that it is bound by the principles of equal protection through the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 215-18 (1995).
219 Kin, 1989 WL 311391, at *2.
220 Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 741 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1313 (2005).
221 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
222 MetroLife Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
223 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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these preferences are simply attempts to subsidize beneficiaries rather than to harm
outsiders, since this is a distinction without a difference. Unfortunately, as with
Powers, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Sagana.224
IV. THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: MERRIFIELD AND ODOM
If "[a]n intent to discriminate is not a legitimate state interest, ' 225 then courts
must pay much more serious attention to the question of whether economic exclusion,
designed solely to keep up the wages of political insiders, constitutes a legitimate
state interest.226 If mere protectionism is a legitimate state interest, it is hard to see
what could possibly, in principle, violate the Equal Protection Clause. Protection-
ism is simply a naked preference - a benefit granted to insiders because they are
insiders, and a wall excluding outsiders simply because they are outsiders. While the
government certainly has the authority to create laws which incidentally benefit pri-
vate parties in the pursuit of general public benefits, not until Powers did a court hold
that the legislature may grant monopoly preferences to preferred groups solely on
the basis of their political power.
A. Occupational Licensing in the Public Perspective
Merrifield v. Lockyer 2 7 presents an excellent example of the pernicious conse-
quences that can arise from the abuse of occupational licensing laws and the rational
basis test used to analyze those laws. I have already noted that, although licensing
is generally intended to accomplish a public benefit (by protecting consumers against
dangerous practices and incompetent practitioners) such laws are often exploited by
private businesses "to advance their own interests in restraining competition." '22 8
Unfortunately, the rational basis test frequently blinds courts to such abuse.
Like Craigmiles, Merrifield challenged the constitutionality of an occupational
licensing scheme that had no sensible public justification at all, but which - the
224 125 S. Ct. 1313 (2005) (No. 04-774).
225 Ranschburg v. Toan, 709 F.2d 1207, 1211 (8th Cir. 1983).
226 For examples of some courts that have considered this issue seriously, see Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 238 F. Supp. 2d 395,416 (D.P.R. 2002) ("Protectionism itself, or
promoting in-state business by discriminating against out-of-state participants, is not a legiti-
mate state interest."), Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 700 F. Supp. 906, 912 (M.D. Tenn.
1988) ("Insulating local operations of a nonresident corporation from interstate competition
is not a legitimate state interest."), Benson v. Zoning Bd. ofAppeals, 27 A.2d 389, 391 (Conn.
1942) (citing supporting cases), and City of Guthrie v. Pike & Long, 243 P.2d 697, 700-01
(Okla. 1952).
227 388 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
228 Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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state's own expert witness admitted - was designed simply to protect the mono-
poly rates of licensees. The plaintiffs229 are wildlife control workers; they trap or
exclude vertebrate pests - such as pigeons, rats, skunks, or raccoons - from struc-
tures, and they install spikes or netting on building ledges to keep birds from roosting
on them. 230 Alan Merrifield and the other plaintiffs do not use pesticides.2 3' But,
under California's Structural Pest Control Act, any professional engaged in vertebrate
pest control in any structure must obtain a Branch 2 Structural Pest Control Operator's
License.232 This can be a significant burden because even to take the two-hundred-
question licensing examination, an applicant must first show proof of having served
two years in the employ of a licensee.233 More disturbingly, the exam does not test
an applicant's knowledge of non-pesticide techniques of pest control; instead, it is
overwhelmingly devoted to a person's knowledge of the proper techniques of handling
pesticides.234 For example, although a person must take and pass this test before put-
ting pigeon-deterring spikes on a building, the examination does not contain a single
question about pigeons, or any other kind of bird, or about spikes.235 Instead, the exam
is overwhelmingly devoted to testing an applicant's knowledge of the proper ways of
handling, using, and storing pesticides, and about invertebrate pests such as moths.236
Perhaps recognizing the silliness of requiring people who do not use pesticides
to become experts on the use of pesticides, one state legislator sought to amend the
law in 1995 to eliminate the licensing requirement for non-pesticide practitioners.237
When this proposal became known, however, licensed pest control workers, seeking
to maintain their control over the industry, opposed it. One organization in particular,
the Pest Control Operators of California (PCOC) lobbied legislators and sent repre-
sentatives to meetings hoping to dissuade the legislature from passing the bill. One
of these lobbyists was PCOC's Eric Paulsen, who later testified as the state's expert
witness. Paulsen explained his organization's opposition to the bill:
229 Merrifield is currently on appeal.
230 See Merrifield, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
231 See id.
232 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 8550(a), 8560(a) (West 1995).
233 Id. § 8562(b). The law also allows an applicant to satisfy this requirement by submitting
"[p]roof satisfactory to the board that the applicant has had.., the equivalent of that exper-
ience." Id.
234 See STRUCTURAL PEST CONTROL BOARD, CANDIDATE'S HANDBOOK FOR OPERATOR
BRANCH 2, at 5-6, available at http://www.pestboard.ca.gov/education/oprbr2_handbook.pdf
(last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
235 See Declaration of Bill Gillespie at 4, Merrifield, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (No. 04-0498-
MMC) (on file with author); Declaration of Randall Blair at 5-6, Merrifield, 388 F. Supp.
2d 1051 (No. C-04-0498-MMC) (on file with author).
236 See Declaration of Bill Gillespie, supra note 235, at 3-5; Declaration of Randall Blair,
supra note 235, at 5-6.
237 See Merrifield, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1053-54.
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[O]ur position would be that - you know, at that time that any-
one trapping these animals should be licensed. And then in the
process of saying, Well, we need to find a compromise, which
is what Assemblywoman Brown called this meeting, you know,
and had her staff oversee, to find a compromise so that the licen-
sing agencies and the industry that is currently licensed to do
this activity and the currently unlicensed individuals could find
a ground where - Well, what's going to be a reasonable rational
way to divide this up so that these individuals can do what they
want to do. Their primary purpose that they were pushing for-
ward was the trapping of mostly vertebrate mammals, but they
also talked about birds.
I said, Well, you guys keep the pigeons. Will that keep you
happy? So you will not oppose our bill. Keep rats, mice and pi-
geons. And we'll take these others. 3
The result of this attempt to divide up the pest control industry was an alteration
to the 1995 amendment which defined the term "vertebrate pests" as not including
rats, mice, or pigeons.23 9 Thus, under the current law, any person practicing structural
pest control must obtain a license, with the exception of practitioners who do not
use pesticides - but this exception does not apply when the work being done in-
volves pigeons, rats, and/or mice.
In other words, if a professional installs a screen on a building to keep a raccoon
out, she does not need a license; if the same person installs the same screen on the
same building to keep a rat out, she does. Excluding pigeons requires a license;
excluding seagulls does not. Meanwhile the test the person is required to take re-
quires her to become familiar with the handling and storage of pesticides which she
does not use - but does not contain a single question about pigeons that she does
deal with.
Mr. Paulsen testified that the requirement that a person have a license for
pigeon, rat, and mouse work, but not for seagull, squirrel, or raccoon work, was "an
interesting quirk in the law."" 4 Asked to explain what he meant by a "quirk," he
testified that the law was "a political piece of legislation in order to make a par-
ticular constituency happy, but it harms the consumer because the consumer ends
up with somebody coming in and doing what has traditionally been a behavior that
requires a professional license."24 The PCOC believed that all pest control work
238 Deposition of Eric R. Paulsen at 115, Merrifield, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (No. C-04-0498-
MMC) (on file with author) [hereinafter Paulsen Deposition].
239 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 8555(g) (West 1995).
240 Paulsen Deposition, supra note 238, at 43.
24' Id. at 45.
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should require a license - a position with which the plaintiffs obviously disagreed.
But both sides agreed that requiring a license for trapping or excluding pigeons,
rats, and mice - but not for trapping or excluding any other kind of pest - made
no sense:
Q: Does it protect the public health and safety to require a person
who does pigeon exclusion work without pesticides in structures
to have a ... license?
Mr. Paulsen: Absolutely.
Q: Does it protect the public health and safety not to require the
same license for seagull exclusion work?
Mr. Paulsen: No, it does not.
Q: Would you call this irrational?
Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I would.242
Finally, Paulsen concluded that "as it pertains to the specific rationale for separating
them [i.e., pigeons, rats, and mice from other animals] ... from a public perspec-
tive, it might be irrational, and.., from my perspective it would make more sense
to leave it all under the Structural Pest Control Board.,
243
The phrase "from a public perspective it might be irrational" is a precise way
to sum up the Merrifield, Powers, and Sagana cases. If mere protectionism is a
legitimate state interest, as Powers held it to be, occupational licensing laws need
not be rational from a public perspective. Simply dividing up the market would be
a legitimate state interest in itself. But the principles of due process and equal pro-
tection require that laws must serve "'the protection of society,"' 2" rather than the
protection of private beneficiaries.
The Merrifieldplaintiffs alleged that requiring them to get a Branch 2 Structural
Pest Control Operator's License deprived them of their right to earn a living without
a rational connection to public health and safety.245 In reply, the state contended
that requiring the license for pigeon, rat, and mouse work, but not for work on other
pests, was rational, because these are the most common and destructive vertebrate
pests.2' As to the fact that the test contains virtually no questions about these ani-
mals, the state argued that this was irrelevant because the test is required to ensure
242 Id. at 46-47.
243 Id. at 149.
244 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,228 (1985) (quoting Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,
121-22 (1889)).
245 See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Merrifield
v. Lockyer, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. C-04-0498-MMC) (on file with
author).
246 See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Merrifield, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1051
(No. C-04-0498-MMC) (on file with huthor).
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that people treating these pests are aware of the dangers of pesticides that might
have been applied to the structure by other pest control technicians.247 Yet this same
knowledge is not required of persons who treat bats, seagulls, or other common struc-
tural pests.
The district court upheld the licensing requirement. Requiring a Branch 2 license
for pigeon work but not for identical seagull work did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the court held, because the legislature might have concluded "that rats, mice,
and pigeons are overwhelmingly the most common vertebrate pests infesting struc-
tures and that.., other vertebrate pests tend to be present inside structures rarely and
incidentally. '2 48 Further, the legislature could have decided to "protect the interests
of pest control consumers by requiring that pest control operators be knowledgeable
about alternative methods of control, about the public health hazards posed by pests,
and about ways of protecting themselves and the public from pesticides previously
applied by others." '49 The court did not explain how this rationale could be consis-
tent with the fact that this knowledge is not required of persons treating other kinds
of pests.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' due process argument - that the licensing
exam does not test the knowledge that the plaintiffs use, and is overwhelmingly
devoted to knowledge that the plaintiffs do not use. Distinguishing Craigmiles and
similar cases, the court found that "purchasers of structural pest control services may
be unaware of hazards arising from the past or current presence of pests, their para-
sites, or pesticides at the site in question,"25 so that any person providing pest control
services (with regard to pigeons, rats, and mice) should be tested on these subjects.
Besides, "pest control operators' work.., involves pest-ridden environments and
thus brings structural pest control operators into direct contact with potential threats
to public health.""25 It was therefore rational in the court's view to require them to
study information about pesticides and invertebrate pests.
The court's rationalizations for the law are contradictory. If requiring practi-
tioners to be knowledgeable about pesticides and invertebrate pests serves the public
health, it is irrational for the state to require this knowledge only for the treatment of
pigeons, rats, and mice, but not for any other kind of vertebrate pests. On the other
hand, if pigeons, rats, and mice are singled out for special requirements because of
their commonness or their destructiveness, it makes no sense for the examination
to include no (or virtually no) questions about these pests.
The Merrifield decision shows the lengths to which courts are impelled to go
under the rational basis test. The undisputed and unambiguous record established
247 Id. at 6.
248 Merrifield, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1060.
251 Id. at 1061.
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that the bizarre licensing scheme was simply designed to protect licensed practi-
tioners against competition from outsiders. The state's expert witness testified to
this fact, and testified that the licensing scheme positively harmed the public health,
and was irrational. The court ignored this evidence, and allowed an acknowledged in-
stance of economic protectionism to stand under a meager camouflage.
B. How Does an Incompetent Florist Threaten Public Health?
Alone among the states, Louisiana requires a professional license for florists.252
Procuring such a license is a significant burden: applicants must pass a one-hour
written examination and a four-hour performance examination, where they are tested
on such subjective criteria as the "harmony" and "effectiveness" of their flower
arrangements." 3 Obviously, the licensing regime makes it very difficult for would-
be florists to obtain licenses; in the years since 2000, fewer than fifty percent of
applicants have passed the examination.254
The notion that such a licensing scheme protects the public health and safety
is simply ludicrous. Indeed, noting that there was no evidence "of any evil in connec-
tion with the sale of flowers and potted plants," the Michigan Supreme Court struck
down a florist licensing law in 1939.25 It concluded that the law "was not [designed]
to protect the citizens of Detroit in their public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare, but was for the financial benefit of a few, 2 56 by limiting the business to a fa-
vored few, without any public-regarding justification. But the federal district court
in Louisiana was less attentive. In Meadows v. Odom,257 the court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Louisiana florist licensing law. After an exhaustive review of the
Powers decision,258 the court concluded that the law served a legitimate public interest.
Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that "people handle millions of unlicensed floral
arrangements around the world every year without being harmed,' 259 the court found
that
the evidence in the record does reveal and support Louisiana's
concern for the safety and protection of the general public. For
example, Ben Knight, the Retail Florist for the State of Louisiana,
testified as follows:
252 See INST. FOR JUSTICE, LET A THOUSAND FLORISTS BLOOM: UPROOTING OUTRAGEOUS
LICENSING LAWS IN LOUISIANA, http://www.ij.org/economicjliberty/laflorists/ backgrounder.
html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 S.S. Kresge Co. v. Couzens, 287 N.W. 427, 430 (Mich. 1939).
256 Id.
257 360 F. Supp. 2d 811 (M.D. La. 2005).
258 Id. at 818-21.
259 Id. at 824.
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I believe that the retail florist does protect people from
injury, the public and their own people. We're very dili-
gent about not having an exposed pick, not having a bro-
ken wire, not have a flower that has some type of in-
fection, like, dirt that remained on it when it's inserted
into something they're going to handle, and I think that
because of this training, that prevents the public from
having any injury.
... The Court finds that the decision of the State of Louisi-
ana to regulate the floral industry and to license those engaged
in the industry by administering a floral licensing examination
is rationally related to the state's desire that floral arrangements
will be assembled properly in a manner least likely to cause in-
jury to a consumer and will be prepared in a proper, cost-efficient
manner. Thus, the Court finds that the examination is rationally
related to the government interest of public welfare and safety.26
That is to say, the licensing scheme was a legitimate way of protecting the
people of Louisiana from scratching their fingers on the wires that florists use to
hold their floral arrangements together.
While this conclusion hardly passes the laugh test, Meadows is, in a sense, less
deplorable than Powers. Where Powers found that protecting an interest group against
economic competition is itself a legitimate state intprest, Meadows at least clung to
some alleged public-regarding rationale. What is troubling is how well it, like
Merrifield, exemplifies the irrational lengths to which courts will sometimes go un-
der the "rational" basis test. But even that test must have its limits. As the Craigmiles
court colorfully put it, when a state's "justifications" for a licensing requirement
"strik[e] us with 'the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish,"' those justi-
fications have reached "a level of pungence almost required to invalidate a statute un-
der rational basis revipw." I6 ' If the notion that scratched fingers are a danger to public
health and safety does not strike us with the same pungence, then nothing will. Justice
Stevens has repeatedly warned us that "Ijiudicial review under the 'conceivable set
of facts' test is tantamount to no review at all,'62 because everything could be made
260 id.
261 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Searan,
259 F.3d 434,447 (6th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56,58 (6th Cir. 1990)).
262 FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See also U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[If
any 'conceivable basis' for a discriminatory classification will repel a constitutional attack
on the statute, judicial review will constitute a mere tantalogical recognition of the fact that
Congress did what it intended to do."); Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that under rational basis, "[t]here must be some congruity between
the [legislative] means employed and the stated end or the [rational basis] test would be a
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"rational" by some stretch of the imagination. The Meadows decision makes Justice
Stevens's concerns startlingly real.
Meadows typifies everything wrong with occupational licensing law - a thin
pretext of public benefit stretched over a blatant example of rent-seeking and anti-
competitive practices. In 2004, when the Louisiana House of Representatives voted
overwhelmingly in favor of a bill to eliminate the florist licensing requirement, the
bill died in the state Senate's Agriculture Committee after intensive lobbying by
licensed florists.2 63 Even the State Commissioner of Agriculture lobbied against the
bill, after interviewing several licensees - but not speaking to any unlicensed, would-
be florists - because (as he later testified) "he had 'committed to the florists' when
running for office that he would 'support [their] desires' of... [either] 'having or
get[ting] rid of the [licensing] law.'"264 The Louisiana florist law is a prime example
of what the "public choice" school of economics calls "legislative capture" - the ex-
ploitation of government's public coercive powers for the benefit of private interest
groups.
CONCLUSION
An earlier generation of lawyers saw law as something other than a mere use
of coercion by the authorities. Law was defined as a general rule of conduct based
on some public need. Limiting a citizen's liberty was not a self-justifying end in
itself, but a way of accomplishing government's primary role in protecting the public
health and safety. In Dent, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of occu-
pational licensing, not because the state could interfere with liberty any time it
chose, but because such deprivations served a legitimate public purpose: protecting
the people from corrupt or incompetent workers. But because occupational licensing
can be of immense economic value to licensed insiders - because it forbids com-
petition - it becomes a prize in the political contest of interest groups.
While, in the past, courts took this problem seriously, the advent of the rational
basis test has removed it from their view. At the birth of the rational basis theory,
one attorney warned that "legislation which gives to a profession a pervasive or con-
trolling voice in selecting those who control admission and standards goes a long way
toward placing the government of a vital field in the hands of those having immediate
interest and concern."265 Things have only grown worse since then. Rather than con-
front the problem, however, the decisions in Powers v. Harris and Sagana v. Tenorio
reinterpret this problem as a legitimate policy goal. The mischiefs of faction are now
nullity.").
263 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. in Support of Appellants at 7, Meadows
v. Odom, No. 05-30450 (5th Cir. 2005) (on file with author).
264 Id. (quoting Deposition of Defendant Bob Odom) (third and fourth alterations in Brief).
265 Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201, 233 (1937).
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seen not as mischiefs, but as permissible governmental purposes. And, as Meadows and
Merrifield demonstrate, the rational basis test can neutralize any court's capacity
to confront these mischiefs.
Perhaps in spite of itself, the Powers court explained the real reason behind its
holding when it noted that "adopting a rule against the legitimacy of intrastate eco-
nomic protectionism and applying it in a principled manner would have wide-ranging
consequences."266 That is true. But unconstitutional laws are not made constitutional
simply because they are common.267 It is sometimes the duty of the courts to make
unpopular decisions and decisions with "wide-ranging consequences." Most of all,
it is the job of the courts to apply rules "in a principled manner." Economic protec-
tionism is not only the sort of animosity that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
violates the Constitution; it is also the sort of mere force that previous generations
did not recognize as law at all.
266 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
267 It is hard to imagine how desegregation could have occurred had the 1950s Supreme
Court been convinced that barring segregation "in a principled manner" would be too difficult.
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